

## **Being in Close Neighborhood with Russia**

### *The Kazakhstan's State-Framed Identity and Latinization of the Script - An Attempt for Westernization or Creating Own Subalternity?*

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#### **Abstract**

*Nazarbayev's initiative on 'Modernization of the Public Consciousness' clearly signaled changes in the state's identity policy. By implementing language reforms and switching the Kazakh alphabet from Cyrillic to Latin script, the state authorities declared their strong willingness to diminish Russia's cultural influence and finally demarcate the state's Cyrillic-based past from Latin-based future. The article argues that despite the Kazakhstan authorities' vehement attempts to reforge the nation's linguistic habits, the state's identity seems to confirm its Subaltern nature: while dreaming to become Western-like, it acts like Russia. The Post-Soviet Studies on Nation-Building Tools help to explore how language and national identity issues come to interplay in Kazakhstan's official discourse, while the Postcolonial theory helps to explore the surprising moments of resemblance between Kazakhstan's and Russia's recent narratives on cultural and educational reforms.*

#### **Keywords**

*Postcolonialism, National Identity, Kazakhstan, Russia, Kazakh language.*

#### **Kazakhstan's State-Framed Identity and the Latinization of the Alphabet**

In April 2017, President Nazarbayev expressed his confidence that the nation's consciousness needs to be modernized (Nazarbayev 2017a). While understanding it more in a cultural way - like a return to traditions and educational reforms - he declared that by 2025 the Kazakh alphabet needs to be re-coded from the Cyrillic to Latin script. The idea was nothing new. The reform was firstly announced in 2006 (Nazarbayev 2006), and in 2012 it was implemented as a part of the strategy 'Kazakhstan-2050' (Nazarbayev 2012a, 2012b). However, the most intriguing moment was related to the forceful adoption of the presidential decree in October 2017 followed by the amendments precipitously issued in February 2018, since it was not clear what system (diphthongs, digraphs or apostrophes) should be used. Commenting on his reform, N.Nazarbayev argued: 'By using the Latin script we are entering the evolving informational world – the language of the internet, the language of science and culture'. Although they claim that Latinization will help in the nation's modernization may be disputable, one could argue that this was the only possible decision by which N.Nazarbayev has reached his political goals. The reform seems ambitious enough to designate possibly the last term of his presidency, yet neutral enough to keep friendly relations with Russia. According to Kazakhstan's population census of 2009, from 10 096 763 inhabitants, Russians represent 23.7 % while Kazakhs 63.1%<sup>2</sup>.

Indeed, for Kazakhstan's political authorities the process of nation's consolidation could turn into a challenging campaign. This is the case especially in a situation when 'your neighbor claims to have a legitimate say in your domestic affairs because, allegedly, a large portion of your population is made up by “their” people' (Isaacs and Polese 2016, p. 2). The common border of nearly 7000 km and high numbers of Russians living in the northern, western, as well as the eastern parts of Kazakhstan 'created an environment conducive to the formation of pro-Russian separatist movements' (Rees and Williams 2017, p. 815).

The state-led language policies always served as the traditional nation-building tools (Anderson 2006; Isaacs and Polese 2016). In 1996, while adopting the first concept on the state's identity, the Kazakh authorities aimed primarily to overcome the state's colonial infantilism and expected the Kazakh language to play a consolidating role in the inter-ethnic communication. In 1997, the Language Law had been adopted declaring that '[i]t is the duty of every citizen of the Republic of Kazakhstan to master the state language' (Burkhanov 2015, p. 6). 'The Language Law also eliminated the status of Russian as a language of interethnic communication but confirmed the Constitution's provision allowing it to be used on an equal basis with the state language in state agencies and local self-government organizations' (Burkhanov 2015, p. 6). Commenting on that situation, 'Kazakhstan's national-patriots', however, believed that despite the state support the 'Kazakh language continues to be marginalised' (Kudaibergenova 2016, p. 919). As no surprise, in the early 2000-s, it became clear that in terms of implementing vernacular language and cultural practices, the 'Kazakhization' process did not succeed due to several reasons: the absence of clear attitudes in self-identification, the prevailing importance of sub-ethnicities vs. the general category, and 'the existence of a weak inner cultural core or “negative identity” among the ruling elite' (Cummings 2005, p. 153). However, since 2007 the situation has started to change gradually. 'The efforts of the Kazakhstani state coalesced around the creation of a distinct, Kazakh-speaking, non-ethnically exclusive “Kazakhstani” nation' (Rees and Williams 2017). In 2011, the state authorities tried to change the tactics from the enforcement of the one-language-policy to the tri-linguistic approach in education (Kazakh, Russian, English). In 2012, N. Nazarbayev announced the final term of the Latinization to be finished by 2025. In 2017, the Latin script of the Kazakh language had been already approved and conveyed to the society. Despite the number of meetings and expert discussions (Melich and Adibayeva 2013, p. 272), no national referendum on the reforms' necessity or their timeliness had been carried on. 'The centralized authorities regularly seek to foster a common identity over a given territory, often without recourse to a plebiscite (Foucher 1991)' (Isaacs and Polese 2016, p. 2). Indeed, whether the Kazakh language would become popular as a result of the state-led reforms is a big issue itself. By contrast, Benedict Anderson argues that although all the nation-states have their print-languages, in some of them only 'a tiny fraction of the population “uses” the national language in conversation or on paper' (Anderson 2006, p. 48). Indisputably, Anderson is right in saying that 'the most important thing about

language is its capacity for generating imagined communities, building in effect particular solidarities' (Anderson 2006, p.136).

The issues of the state's identity and language policy implementation (as a state toolkit in the process of the nation-building) intersect in the domain of 'nationalizing nationalisms' (Brubaker 1996, pp. 5, 9, 83-84, 103, 106). The political elites of the existing states undertake nationalizing practices 'in the name of a "core nation"' as 'the legitimate owner of the state' (Brubaker 1996, p. 5). In Roger Brubaker's understanding, a nationalizing state is 'the state of and for a particular ethnocultural "core nation" whose language, culture demographic position, economic welfare, and political hegemony must be protected and promoted by the state' (Brubaker 1996, p. 103). According to Brubaker, 'the new states of post-Communist Eurasia', being represented by their elites as 'incomplete' or 'unrealized' nations, have aptly used the rhetoric of resentment towards the state's past and its lost opportunities, which provided a solid ground for promotion of the language and the culture of the core nation (Brubaker 1996, p. 9). The criteria of the nationalizing state are in place in the case of Kazakhstan. Throughout the manifold strategic documents, the interests of the core nation (the Kazakh nation), as well as the promotion of the Kazakh language and culture have been prioritized since the early years of the state's sovereignty. The resentments against the oppressive colonial past – the totalitarian regime under the USSR - which deprived the Kazakhs of learning their mother language still serve as a good toe-hold in the current process of crafting the state identity by N.Nazarbayev (Nazarbayev 1996, 1997b, 1999a, 2001, 2008, 2011, 2012a, 2012b, 2015, 2016, 2017). 'By evoking the metaphor of "language death", the elites represented the survival of their language as tantamount to the survival of their nation' (Davé 2007, p. 100). Kazakhstan, in analogy with other postcolonial states, 'has attempted to manufacture a unifying, official national idea to co-opt the various autonomous, local articulations of a language-based, genealogically defined Kazakh identity that are at odds with the state-sponsored ethnolinguistic revival' (Davé 2007, p. 170).

The article aims not to contribute to the existing debates on the forging processes of Kazakhstan's identity in traditional or non-traditional; civic, ethnic, nationalistic or religious dimensions (Bhavna Davé 2007, Chris Donnacha O'Beachain and Rob Kevlihan 2013, Rico Isaacs and Abele Polese 2015, 2016). Kazakhstan's supra-ethnic identity have been also explored by Kristoffer Michael Rees and Nora Webb Williams (2017). The insightful work on how non-Kazakh ethnicities - the Tatar and Korean minorities – have been able to adapt to the official discourse on Kazakhstani identity in order to win their own places in cultural-political and economic realms is provided by Yves-Marie Davenel and EunsilYim (2016). The processes of how the state-led developmental strategies (like Strategy-2030) serve to exercise presidential control on the central and regional levels have been explored by Diana Kudaibergenova (2015) not to purport to go deep into the various aspects of the Kazakh nation's ethnogenesis, the heritage of the tribal relations or the Soviet and post-Soviet legacies as parts of the nation-building processes. These issues had been aptly explored in the works by Shirin Akiner (1995), Terry Martin (2001), Martha

Brill Olcott (2002), Francine Hirsch (2005), Sally Cummings (2005), Bhavna Davé (2007).

Instead, the focus is on how Kazakhstan's political elites have attempted to cut off the cultural influence of Russia by carrying out the recent Latinization of script and trying to demarcate between Cyrillic-based linguistic past and Latin-based future. More specifically, the emphasis is on how Kazakhstan authorities have attempted to use the alphabet's Latinization issue in the official discourse on the national identity's forging, and why the last state-led initiative of Kazakhstan RukhaniZhangiru[Руханижаңғыру], in certain ways, resembles the Russian official discourse on cultural and educational reforms. If the Kazakhstan script's Latinization could be classed as a process of decolonization, then why Kazakhstan's way of de-colonization resembles Russia's discourse? Do the Kazakhstan elites consciously resemble Russia's discourse; or is it a mere 'semblance' or 'similitude' (Bhabha 1994, p. 172)? The article consists of four main chapters. In the next chapter, a brief sketch of the critical voices of scholars who consider the post-Soviet space as a theoretical caveat for its post-socialist or post-Soviet past and put under the question the applicability of postcolonialism to the Central Asian region as a whole. The theoretical part is also complemented by the references to the current studies on how Kazakhstan's political authorities use the postcolonial rhetoric to legitimate their nationalizing policy on the Kazakh language, as well as how the non-state actors (citizens) in Kazakhstan reflect the state-driven language reform by creating a counter-hegemonic narrative. Further, examine Kazakhstan's official discourse on the recent language and education reforms. Firstly, the analyses of Kazakhstan's main strategic documents related to the national identity and language issues, which had been adopted in the period between 1996-2017. By tracing any predictions of the 'national identity' with any relation to the language/languages and Latinization, the search for the changes in internal structures of the documents through time. Secondly, by drawing parallels between Kazakhstan's and Russia's recent strategic documents on cultural and educational reforms on an attempt to trace some parallels of resemblance. However, I do not attempt to provide a comprehensive picture of resemblances is not attempted rather, to provide some tentative explanation of the observed tendencies. The content analysis of the presidential and state secretary's speeches, as well as the metaphor analysis complement this empirical part.

### **Theoretical background**

The question of applicability of the postcolonial theory to the Central Asian states has been aptly explored in many works by David Chioni Moore (2001), Deniz Kandiyoti (2002), Bhavna Davé (2007), Laura Adams (2008), MadinaTlostanova (2010, 2017), Sergey Abashin (2014), Catherine Owen, John Heathershaw and Igor Savin More (2017). According to some of the scholars, the case of Central Asia stays apart from the classical cases of Western colonization because the region did not pass through the reformative processes of modernity. As Deniz Kandiyoti argues, 'the field of post-colonial studies is itself Eurocentric to the extent that it privileges a particular type of colonial encounter—namely, that between the capitalist metropolises of the West and their colonies or semi-colonies in the rest of the world' (Kandiyoti 2002, p. 286). Madina

Tlostanova, while exploring the Central Asian states' ways of de-colonization, argues that the theorists should differ between the socialist modernity and the modernity itself. According to her, the post-socialist experience is not a conventional type of colonialism (Tlostanova 2017, p. 11). 'The Socialist experience cannot be taken exclusively to ideology the same way as it cannot be limited by colonialism. It existed at their intersection leading to the creation of a model which – after the collapse of Socialism – turned out to be colonial as a whole, about the winning neoliberal modernity/coloniality, yet retaining traces of its own internal imperial-colonial structures' (Tlostanova 2017, p. 11). However, at the same time, there is still a lot of common between the Western/liberal/capitalist and socialist modernity, 'since the Socialist modernity, after all, originated in the West and therefore shared such familiar features of modernity as progressivism, Orientalism, racism, providentialism, hetero-patriarchy, and a cult of newness' (Tlostanova 2017, p. 6). Laura Adams to the Central Asian region invites us to go beyond merely borrowing descriptive terms... and to refine postcolonial theory by exposing it to a broader range of imperial projects, especially those that are not based on capitalism as a historical mode of domination' (Adams 2008, p. 6). What postcolonial and post-Western scholars have in common is 'their focus on power relations between dominant and subordinate actors and a recognition of the effects of imperial legacies in contemporary international politics' (Owen, Heathershaw and Savin 2017, p. 2). Overall, it would not be a mistake to use postcolonial theory to trace how the state authorities use their power to build up the hybrid discourse by borrowing and re-articulating the terms and tools from their Russian vis-a-vis.

To understand the continuity of Kazakhstan's postcolonial identity and the resemblance of Russia's cultural reforms in Kazakhstani discourse, two concepts: Homi Bhabha's notion of the 'mimicking' and 'hybridity' (Bhabha 1994), and Gaytri Spivak's concept of 'subalternity' (Spivak 1988) has been borrowed. To understand how by inserting the Western-like, Asian-like, Russian-like models of resemblance, Kazakhstan's political elites have created a state-subaltern, which is addicted to following any other path, except the own way. For Spivak, the subaltern is the one who cannot speak or lack modes of representation (Spivak 1988). Bhabha's concept of mimicking helps 'to explore how states are challenging the hegemony' of master's practices and institutions (Owen, Heathershaw and Savin 2017, p. 8). As a result of mimicking, it is 'almost the same, but not quite' (Bhabha 1994, p. 85-92). The subordinate actors 'are not passive receptors of imperial/neo-imperial projects but can disrupt and appropriate those projects for their ends, both at the institutional and everyday levels' (Owen, Heathershaw and Savin 2017, p.9). The postcolonial identity is in place in case of the post-Soviet states: while Russia resembles the Western normative order by using subversive techniques and tries to catch up with the Western modernization (Morozov 2015), Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Kazakhstan (in terms of adoption of legislation) emulate Russia's political discourse and institutions (Owen, Heathershaw and Savin 2017, p. 16). The further analysis demonstrates how the Kazakh authorities resemble the Russian discourse - in terms of

usage of phrases and instruments; in holding similar cultural events or declaring similar political initiatives; and even in implementing into practice Russia-like activities, like support of the Cadet schools or military-sport patriotic youth camps (as it is widely practiced in Russia).

The postcolonialism of any nation is tightly bounded to the decolonization of consciousness of the subjugated minds. 'Colonialism is, first of all, a matter of consciousness and needs to be defeated ultimately in the minds of men' (Ashis Nandy 1983, p. 63). The question of decolonization is two-fold. On the one hand, it is the political elites who create and popularize the nation-building ideas through the political discourse (Isaacs and Polese 2015, p. 372), which needs to be explored in my article. On the other hand, it is non-state actors who have their strong say when internalizing the state-led policy or rejecting it (Isaacs and Polese 2015, p. 372). As Isaacs and Polese argue, the 'nation-building can only be proposed by elites but needs to be accepted (or renegotiated/rejected) by those who have a say in the construction of a national identity and who are an integrated aspect of the nation-building process' (Isaacs and Polese 2015, p. 372). Bhavna Davé, while commenting on the de-colonization of Kazakhstan's elites, pointed out that the former Soviet elites have 'successfully reconfigured themselves to achieve normalization and legitimacy' (Davé 2007, p. 24). In the contrast, for the state, being independent means, first of all, a 'process of decolonization and the construction of an autonomous national imagination' (Davé 2007, p. 24). In practice, Kazakhstan's political elites re-appropriated the official discourse on decolonization, and rather than invoking wide critical intellectual discussions they keep this place empty of talks (Kudaibergenova 2016, p.917). As far as the postcolonial sense of the state is not fully realized, and the people are deprived of intellectual talks, the Kazakhstani society stays 'subjugated' by its nation-builders and their manipulative discourse (Kudaibergenova 2016, p. 933). All in all, it is the political elites in power who invoke the emulative, resembling or subversive strategies into the hybridized discourse. As long the political elites will not attempt to de-colonize their consciousness and open the space for critical intellectual thinking, the nation will remain 'subaltern' – like the one in-between, missing of representation, not being able to retain its power over its realm.

Kazakhstan's postcolonialism as a political and nationalizing discourse, appropriated by the political elites and the contesting groups, has been explored by Diana Kudaibergenova. As Kudaibergenova claims, the Kazakhstan's ruling class use and abuse the postcolonial rhetoric to legitimate their political goals, whilst the political opposition and national patriots are kept aside from intellectual debates on the nation's decolonization, including 'official discussions on ethnicity, language, and national identity' (Kudaibergenova 2016, pp. 917, 925). For the ruling elites, 'Re-legitimizing their positions in the post-Soviet era meant that they had to accept the language of former oppression and position themselves as legitimate guardians of the post-Soviet nation. The only way to do so was to construct their own narratives on post-Soviet postcoloniality' (Kudaibergenova 2016, p. 921). Apart from the political elites and opposition, it is the

national patriots, who still 'see the problem of historicity of postcolonialism unresolved' and condemn the people-in-power for lack of efforts in the state's decolonization - by the means of core language's forceful promotion (Kudaibergenova 2016, p. 919). All in all, Kazakhstan remains in an uncomfortable position of the postcolonial state 'where memories of former oppression and domination by the Russian and Soviet empires are framed in dangerously loose, yet very popular, political narratives' (Kudaibergenova 2016, p. 933). In the next chapter, I am going to explore how the language issue has been used in the official discourse, and how the 'cohesive role' of the Kazakh language has changed through time.

### **The Analysis of Texts: Comparing the Strategic Programs**

The analysis is done in two steps. Firstly, nine official programs which had been adopted within 1996-2017. These are the Concept on the state identity (1996), the Strategy 'Kazakhstan-2030' (1997), the Doctrine on national unity-2020 (2010), the Strategy 'Kazakhstan-2050' (2012), the Patriotic Act Mangylik El [Мәңгілік Ел] (2014), the Concept on strengthening and development of the national identity and unity (2015), 100 steps of implementation of the institutional reforms (2015), the Program on Modernization of the Public Consciousness RukhaniZhangiru[Руханижаңғыру] (2017), the Strategy 'Kazakhstan-2025' (2018). All texts are uploaded on the official site [www.akorda.kz](http://www.akorda.kz). Additionally, analyses of the Presidential speeches made at the annual sessions of Assembleiaiia Naroda Kazakhstanana (the Assembly of People of Kazakhstan) in 1996, 1997a, 1999a, 1999b, 2000, 2001, 2003, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012b, 2013a, 2014b, 2015, 2016, 2017b. The materials of the Assembly are extremely important to be grasped in the analysis since the Assembly is conceived as a 'supra-political structure' (Nazarbayev 2013a, 2014b), which presents the Kazakhstani identity 'decoupled from ethnonational derived identities' (Rees and Williams 2017). While analyzing the documents, the search for the general changes in internal structures through time was taken up. Specifically, to start by tracing any predictions of the 'national identity' to 'the Kazakh language', 'the Latinization reform', 'the Russian/English languages', as well as 'the languages of other ethnicities'. While analyzing the texts, it was interesting to trace how the state authorities have attributed the 'cohesive role' to the Kazakh language/Kazakh culture/Kazakh ethnicity or people/Assembly of People of Kazakhstan.

Second, to compare Kazakhstan's and Russia's official discourse there was a need to consult four principal documents: the Nazarbayev's address to the Nation on the Strategy 'Kazakhstan-2050' (Nazarbayev 2012a) and Nazarbayev's address to the Nation on Rukhani Zhangiru (Nazarbayev 2017a), as well as Putin's pre-election article (Putin 2012a) and Putin's Address to the Federal Council (Putin 2012b). In the first place, Kazakhstan's materials had been put under analysis, followed by the analysis of the relevant documents from Russia's official side. The analysis is supplemented by the metaphor analysis of the speeches made by the senior officials. The comparative analysis of two discourses helped to reveal the certain structure of resemblances in terms of the documents' structure, tools, and phrases. While analyzing the documents, the peculiar interest is to draw some

parallels and give a tentative explanation to the commonalities rather than providing an exhaustive list of resemblances.

### **The official discourse on Kazakhstan's Identity and Kazakh language**

Over the past two decades, the state policy on the nation-building process in Kazakhstan has been focused on the promotion of the ideas of the civic state, as well as Kazakh language and culture (Yves-Marie Davenel and EunsilYim 2016, p. 46). Indeed, the Kazakh language and culture have been steadily used by the state authorities as a cohesive or binding force, which is supposed to grasp the heterogeneous society of Kazakhstan and forge the 'Kazakhstani' identity. While in the late 1990s, the rhetoric of the political authorities mostly approached to the country's colonial past and described the Kazakh nation as being deprived of its language, in the mid of 2000-s the official discourse seemed to be more assertive in promoting of the Kazakh language as 'the language of languages'. However, despite the state legislative support, the Kazakh language for a long time has remained as 'the language of the poor and marginalized' (Bissenova2004). Beginning in 2005, the political authorities have started to invoke the idea of the Latinization into the official discourse. Both announcements of 2005 and 2012 coincided with the start of Nazarbayev's presidency terms and did not stipulate any practical movements. Mostly they had been conceived as the state-led endeavors to measure the society's overall reflections before embarking on the final stage. 'The main factor, which cements the nation is the Kazakh language, the language of the state<sup>4</sup>' (Nazarbayev 2013a). In 2013, by invoking parallels with the disappearing languages N.Nazarbayev seemed to be trying to assure the nation in the necessity of the Latinization. 'Nowadays in the world, according to various data, from 10 to 25 unwritten languages extinct, the complex strata of ethnical cultures are wiped out<sup>5</sup>' (Nazarbayev 2013a). The presidential announcement of 2017 appears to be his last call for the Latinization. In this vein, the events in Crimea of 2014 should not be dismissed as the main reason for the reform's acceleration. Apart from the Kazakh language, 'Russian is also distinguished from the other non-Kazakh languages spoken in the republic', which have not been given the official status according to the constitution (Rees and Williams 2017). Alongside with the Kazakh and Russian languages, the crucial importance is given to the English language, since the system of three-language instruction in schools has been officially implemented in 2017. Table-1 Demonstrates, how the idea of Kazakh language has evolved in the official discourse within 1996-2017.

Table 1 illustrates how the political authorities have used the Kazakh language as a state toolkit in the forging of identity. Between 1996-2007, alongside with the Kazakh language and culture, the cohesive role was attributed to the Assembly of People of Kazakhstan as to the instrument if the inter-ethnic concord and unity, however since 2008, the state-framed focus has shifted to 'the Kazakh ethnicity' [казахскийэтнос] and 'the Kazakh people' [казахскийнарод] as a 'consolidating power' [консолидирующаясила]. In January 2014, the Kazakh language has acquired a new abstract status: a MangylikTil

[Мәңгіліктіл]<sup>15</sup> or Eternal language. In 2015, the state-built identity has been renamed accordingly *Manğylik El* [МәңгілікЕл] or Eternal country in Nazarbayev's understanding<sup>16</sup> (Nazarbayev 2016). Interestingly, before the idea of the Eternal country, in February 2014, N. Nazarbayev suggest renaming Kazakhstan differently as the *Kazakh Eli* [Қазақели] or the Land of Kazakhs. By rebranding the state and discarding the ending 'stan', which he thought to be perceived with negative connotations, N. Nazarbayev believed to help to change the fate of the nation: 'The name of our state contains this ending - "stan", as well as other Central Asian states possess it. Currently, the foreigners express an interest in Mongolia with two million population, which does not have "stan" in its name. Therefore, we should consider the possibility of changing the name to the "Kazakh Eli",

Table 1 "Identity and the use of language in the official discourse within 1996-2017"

	1996 <sup>6</sup>	1997	1998 <sup>8</sup>	2000 <sup>9</sup>	2001 <sup>10</sup>	2003 <sup>11</sup>	2005 <sup>12</sup>	2006 <sup>13</sup>	2007 <sup>14</sup>
Predication of "identity"	Civic identity; Kazakhstani identity	Civic identity; Eurasian identity	Multiethnic identity; Kazakhstani identity	Civic identity; Kazakhstani identity	Civic identity	Civic identity; Kazakhstani identity	Multiethnic identity	Civic identity	Civic identity
Cohesive role	Kazakh language; Kazakh nation	Kazakh culture	Kazakh language; the Assembly of the Peoples of Kazakhstan	Kazakh culture	Kazakh culture	Kazakh language; Kazakh culture; the Assembly of the Peoples of Kazakhstan	Kazakh language; Kazakh culture; Kazakh people	Kazakh language	Kazakh language
Language	Kazakh; Russian; other ethnic languages	Kazakh; Russian; English	Kazakh; Russian; other ethnic languages	Kazakh; Russian; Others	Kazakh; Russian; other ethnic languages	Kazakh; Russian; other ethnic languages	<i>Latinization</i> Kazakh; Russian; English; other ethnic languages	Kazakh; Russian; English	Kazakh; Russian; English; other ethnic languages

however it first must be discussed with our people<sup>171</sup>. Not surprisingly, the nationalistic idea Kazakh Eli did not succeed in its implementation, instead, the loose and stretchable- 'Eternal country with Eternal language' has won. Contrary to the top-down analysis, when the scholars explore how national identity is 'imagined' by political elites, Kristoffer Rees and Nora Webb Williams conducted an extended interview in Almaty, Shymkent, and Oskemen to know whether the state-led identity policy reflects the citizens' aspirations (Rees and Williams 2017). According to the insightful findings of Rees and Williams, the cohesive role of the Kazakh language might be considered as a serious limitation in the building of the supra-ethnic identity as there is a significant number of the non-Kazakh speaking population (both, among the non-Kazakh ethnicities and Kazakhs themselves)

Continuation of the Table 1

	2017 <sup>27</sup>	2016 <sup>26</sup>	2015 <sup>25</sup>	2014 <sup>24</sup>	2013 <sup>23</sup>	2012 <sup>22</sup>	2011 <sup>21</sup>	2010 <sup>20</sup>	2009 <sup>19</sup>	2008 <sup>18</sup>
National identity	National identity	Civic identity based on <i>Mangylik El</i> [Мәңгілік Ел]	Civic identity based on <i>Mangylik El</i> [Мәңгілік Ел] // 28	Civic identity	Kazakhstani identity (one nation-one country-one destiny)	Kazakhstani identity (one country-one nation)	Kazakhstani identity	Kazakhstani identity (one country-one destiny)	Civic identity; Kazakhstani identity	Multithemic identity
Kazakh culture <i>Latinization</i>	Supranational values; the Assembly of People of Kazakhstan	Kazakh language; Kazakhstani culture	Kazakh language or <i>Mangylik El</i> [Мәңгілік Ел]	Kazakh people; Kazakh language	Kazakh people; Kazakh language	Kazakh language	Kazakh language	Kazakh people; Kazakh language	Kazakh language	Kazakh ethnicity; Kazakh language; the Assembly of People of Kazakhstan
Kazakh; English	Kazakh; Russian; English	Kazakh; Russian; English; other ethnic languages	Kazakh; Russian; English; other ethnic languages	Kazakh; Russian; English; other ethnic languages	Kazakh; other ethnic languages	Kazakh; Russian; English	Kazakh; Russian; English; other ethnic languages	Kazakh; other ethnic languages	Kazakh; Russian; English; other ethnic languages	Kazakh; Russian; English; other ethnic languages

Source: [www.akorda.kz](http://www.akorda.kz), [www.assembly.kz](http://www.assembly.kz)

who do not speak the Kazakh language. Moreover, as Rees and Williams argue, although the non-Kazakh speaking respondents confirm their affiliation with the Kazakhstani identity, for many of them 'their identification as Kazakhstani is, from the perspective of language choice, a counter-state identification' (Rees and Williams 2017). Even though the non-Kazakh speaking citizens recognize the state-led Kazakhstani identity, they reframe it 'into a counter-state narrative of identity that refutes the necessity of Kazakh language knowledge for belonging in the Kazakhstani political community'(Rees and Williams 2017). Indeed, between the state-led policies on nation-building and how they are received by non-state actors, there could remain 'grey zones' (Isaacs and Polese 2015, p. 371).

To understand this cleavage in the state-citizens dialogue on the language issue, we should pay attention to the highly contested state-led model of the Kazakhstani identity (Isaacs and Polese 2015, pp. 371-372, 375-376). Indeed, 'the Kazakh political authorities by holding experiments with different approaches and models, including Eurasia, Turkic brotherhood and civic Kazakhstani nation preferred to embark on the neo-Soviet approach of the "one big family"' (Burkhanov and Sharipova 2015, p. 26). On the other hand, the state authorities in parallel to the idea of the Kazakhstani identity or Kazakhstanness (which aims at the ethnic minorities) promote the ideas of Kazakhness, the political entity of the titular Kazakh nation and the titular Kazakh language (Laurelle 2015, p. 2). As Laruelle suggests, the idea of Kazakhstanness will be vanished up with time as the Slavic minorities would represent the decreasing part of the state's population, while the ethnic minorities would be given their rights 'in a folkloric way', and 'there are few chances that a movement contesting the Kazakhness of Kazakhstan will emerge in the years ahead' (Laurelle 2015, p. 16). The Latinization reform seems to prove this point of view. First, the state-led policy of Latinization is aimed at the Kazakh audience (and mostly targets the young generation at schools and civil servants who need to learn the Latinized alphabet in a forced way). While the citizens affiliate themselves with the Kazakhstani identity, they do not fully recognize the Kazakh language's cohesive or bounding role. This lack of consent among the citizens is not something new since the state-led policy is implemented in the authoritative top-down way. As Davé argues, in Kazakhstan 'the obstacles to forging an integrationist, civic statehood come from the authoritarian-patrimonial system that uses a mix of ideological rhetoric, informal and personalist control, coercion and co-optation to continuously manage and regulate the role and standing of its ethnic minorities' (Davé 2007, p. 136). As a whole, Kazakhstan's state developmental concepts are ambivalent, in the core, as the state authorities have to find uneasy accommodation between their own regime's legitimation and intra-elite aspirations (Kudaibergenova 2015, p. 450). So far just a few voices officially came out to protest in Kazakhstan – the voices of the 'Slavic-Turkic Unity of Kazakhstan', as well as the 'Russian society in Kazakhstan', who published their manifests the same day in one newspaper released by 'Semirech'e Cossack Community'<sup>29</sup> in Almaty. Davé, while commenting on the absence of voices on the language issue in Kazakhstan, argues that

this question is 'paradoxically linked to the failure of the ruling elites to develop a shared national idea and to rally the support of the society in cultural and identity construction and institution-building' (Davé 2007, p. 171). On contrast, many voices condemning Latinization and regarding it as a sign of 'bewilderment', 'treachery', 'undermining of Russia's authority in the region', and even as 'spitting to Russia's side' belong to the political elites of Russia.

With keeping Laruelle's argument in mind, it is easy to answer another question of Rees and Williams who reasonably ask why the state authorities in 2014 instead of promoting the ideas of Kazakhstani and Kazakhstanness, invoked the idea of the Mangylik El rather than ult, halyq, or something else' (Rees and Williams 2017). Further, why in 2017 N. Nazarbayev instead of supporting the ideas of Kazakhstanness invoked the idea of Kazakhness by declaring the Rukhani Zhangiru program and inviting the nation to preserve the Kazakh traditions, Kazakh literature, wedding ceremonies, and ancient pre-Soviet monuments. Do the political authorities believe that ethnic minorities living in Kazakhstan take care of the preservation of the authentic Kazakh culture? Again, the answer lies in the hybrid (Laruelle 2015, p. 1), three-faceted nature of the state-led identity, no matter how Kazakhstan's political authorities call such approach, as a 'moderate' or 'skillful' (Davé 2007, p. 103), it conveys ambivalent decisions into the societal life. As Kudaibergenova succinctly points, the 'compartmentalised ideology captures how Nazarbayev's quasi-ideology shuffled between these multiple discourses, adjusting to the "audiences" targeted by his message' (Kudaibergenova 2016, p. 921). In the core, the last presidential messages on coming back to traditions and Latinization have been directly addressed to the Kazakh audience, while the rest of the society (the ethnic minorities) have been provided their 'folkloric ways' of expression. As far as the state-led policy prioritize 'the core' of its citizenry, the ideas like Kazakhstanness would remain formal, while Latinization would turn into a sacralized category.

### **Kazakhstan's and Russia's Official Discourses on Cultural and Educational Reforms: Striking Resemblances**

Let us begin this chapter by invoking a contentious argument: Kazakhstan, while dreaming to become a Western-like, acts like Russia. The first half of the argument: 'dreaming to become a Western-like' should be understood broadly as the embracement of the Western values and the capitalist order, and in this chapter, it is primarily related to the state's normative dependence on the West. The Western normative dependence of Kazakhstan's political authorities in the process of the identity's crafting could be traced elsewhere. Rees and Williams, while analyzing Kazakhstan's regime's policies have noticed their plausible affiliation to the 'Western models of minority rights'; 'liberal-oriented multiculturalism'; 'democratic regime' (Rees and Williams 2017), no matter how symbolic, declaratory or superficial they are in practice. The standards of the international organizations have been officially put into the basis of the main official documents on the state identity<sup>30</sup>. Not only the Kazakhstan authorities' 'commitment to internationalism and

civic statehood' (Davé 2007, p. 103), but also the Western-like institutions<sup>31</sup>, economic modernization<sup>32</sup>, cultural<sup>33</sup> and educational<sup>34</sup> reforms have been internalized by the political elites. By drawing parallels with the United States, Germany, Sweden, Finland, as well as the EU and NAFTA the state authorities have targeted the ideal models for resemblance (Abdikalikova 2015a, 2016a, 2017a). Let me bring two remarkable citations by the State Secretary Gul'shara Abdikalikova<sup>35</sup>. 'Not so long time ago the US President Obama in his address to the US Congress of 21/01/2015 accentuated the economics of the middle class. This proves again that the strategic course of the Elbasy [Елбасы] is right, actual and taken on time<sup>36</sup> (Abdikalikova 2015b). Or another remark by her, 'George Bush Senior... said about our president in a simple and disarming way: "He could predict the future"<sup>37</sup>' (Abdikalikova 2015d). In this relation, Kazakhstan's case does not stay far from Russia's case where the political elites are also dependent on Western approval (Morozov 2015). Parallel to the Western norms, the political elites of Kazakhstan admire the Asian approaches<sup>38</sup> in the nations' modernization of Japan, Malaysia, Indonesia and China (Abdikalikova 2017b). The state's long-term programs like Strategy-2050 have been adopted following the experience of China, Malaysia and Turkey (Nazarbayev 2014a). Kazakhstan's democracy has emerged similarly to Japan, Singapore and South Korea (Nazarbayev 2013b). The state-owned sovereign wealth fund 'Samruk-Kazyna' has been based on the experience of the similar institutions in Singapore, Malaysia, and the United Arab Emirates<sup>39</sup> (Nazarbayev 2014c). States as Singapore, Malaysia, South Korea, Hongkong, Taiwan, and the United Arab Emirates serve as models where the state language is combined with the usage of the English language (Nazarbayev 2012b, 2015). However, this also speaks in favor of Western dependence.

More often both the Western and Asian approaches are involved in the comparison. For example, the United States, Germany, Singapore, and Great Britain are experienced in having meritocratic state civil service (Abdikalikova 2016b), while China, Malaysia, Russia, as well as the United States and Germany are good in support of scientists (Abdikalikova 2016c). The anticorruption Law of Kazakhstan has grasped the experience of such states like Singapore, South Korea, Hongkong, Estonia, and Georgia<sup>40</sup>. However, here is a statement to mention N.Nazarbayev's disappointment in any of the models of resemblance: 'Some of the state and political leaders in different formats have attempted to embed us into their ideas of Panislamism, on the one side, as well as Pan-Turkism, on the other side, and so-called "values and benefits" of the Western civilization, freedom, and democracy... However, the Kazakhstani people, managed to take our fate into our hands<sup>41</sup>' (Nazarbayev 2015). Despite many other examples, which I do not quote here, the claim that much like the state-led policy on Kazakhstan's identity is highly contentious like the state-led talk on 'Which model should we follow?' is also contested and subject to the demands of the political authorities. The Western normative standards are highly desirable for copying in practice, even if in a declaratory and superficial way while the Asian models serve as models for making references to, personal inspirations of N.Nazarbayev (as in the case with Lee Kuan Yew) or mere rationale for setting up new

state-owned institutions channeled by public budget.

The second part of the argument: 'Kazakhstan acts like Russia' is the most intriguing one which needs to unfold further. Table 2 demonstrates the striking commonalities between Kazakhstan's and Russia's official discourse on cultural and educational reforms. The comparison of the documents Strategy 'Kazakhstan-2050' (Nazarbayev 2012a) and Rukhani Zhangiru (Nazarbayev 2017a) demonstrates almost the same political agenda compared to Russia's presidential messages on the 'National question' (Putin 2012a) and 'Spiritual Bonds' (Putin 2012b). The documents span the same range of questions: (1) historically important events of the state; (2) role of values (traditions, culture, patriotism); (3) state-led practices in the nation-building (promotion of the interests of the core nation, its language and culture); (4) threats to the state's security (value crisis and alien ideologies); (5) models for positive resemblance (e.g. success of Hollywood-made movies); (6) tools of education (e.g. '100 textbooks'); (7) support for the regional intelligentsia.”

While both presidents recognize the necessity to catch up with the world industrial and technological achievements, the cultural globalization stays aside of their interests. N.Nazarbayev, alongside with V.Putin call the nation to guard the national cultural core and traditions: in case of Russia, this plan has been called as 'Spiritual Bonds' [Духовныескрепы] (Putin 2012b), while in Kazakhstan as RukhaniZhangiru [Руханижаңғыру] (Nazarbayev 2017a). Both presidents stress out the responsibility of every citizen to be a patriot and pay significant attention to the patriotic education of the youth, what is reflected in the Patriotic act Mangylik El of 2014 in Kazakhstan, and in the Program on the Patriotic Education 2011-2015 in Russia, which has been regularly prolonged since 2001. As far as history is concerned, it is the quite surprising moment to notice that N.Nazarbayev refers to 1000-years of the Kazakh history and culture (Nazarbayev 2017a). Probably, the reason lies in the provocative speech of V.Putin at the Seliger meeting in 2014, where he expressed his confidence that 'The Kazakhs never had a statehood [before Nazarbayev]' and that 'The Kazakhs support the ideas of Eurasianism because they benefit from ... staying in the space of the so-called big Russian world'<sup>43</sup>, which forced the changes in Kazakhstan's state-led identification. The above-given commonalities, probably, do not prove absolutely that one state imitates the other. However, there are some reasons to suspect it to be the case. The Kazakhstan elites' post-independent 'assumption of power' has been closely related to Russia, as its political and historical Other, 'as a result of the interaction with Russia, Kazakhstan influenced Russification economically, socially and culturally' (Cummings 2005, p. 14). Indeed, to a large extent, some similarities could be explained by the Soviet past, which imposed the common normative values, as 'patriotism'<sup>44</sup>. The political elites of Kazakhstan, as well as of Russia have re-adopted the ideas of the 'Soviet patriotism', as the main non-official ideology. In this relation, some state-led processes of building up of the historical memory take the same forms: through invocation of respect for the 9th of May as a Day of victory over the 'brown plague of fascism' (Nazarbayev 2014), as well as establishing the state-

Table 2 “Comparison of Kazakhstan's and Russia's discourse on cultural and educational reforms

Historical Events	Russia		Kazakhstan	
	January 2012 1000 Years of History	December 2012 1000 Years of History	December 2012 300 Years since the Anrakay Battle 42	April 2017 1000 Years of History
Values	The Russian Cultural Code	<i>The Peoples' Traditions</i>	<i>The Traditions and Culture is a genetical code</i>	<i>The National Culture and National Code</i>
Identity in relation with	Civil patriotism	Family values <i>Patriotism is a civil responsibility</i>	Family institute <i>New Patriotism is an overall responsibility</i>	<i>Patriotism</i>
Threats	Multinational Identity <i>The Russian culture</i> <i>The Russian people</i>	National and Spiritual Identity <i>The Russian culture</i> <i>The Russian people</i> <i>The Russian language</i>	Kazakhstani identity <i>The Kazakh people</i> <i>The Kazakh language</i>	National Identity <i>The Kazakh culture</i>
Positive models for resemblance	Inter-ethnic conflicts Nationalism Religious intolerance	<i>Value crisis.</i> Value catastrophe in 21th Century Shortage of —spiritual bondsll	Civilizational value crisis. Crisis of the world-outlook [мировоззренческих] and ideological values	Negative foreign ideological influence
Instruments	<i>Hollywood movies production</i> <i>100 books which every pupil must read (with reference to the US experience in the 1920-s)</i> <i>The Cultural Therapy</i>	-	-	<i>Hollywood movies production</i> <i>100 overseas textbooks in social sciences which need to be translated to the Kazakh language</i>
		The Russian culture influences on the worldculture. <i>Support of the cultural projects by the state</i> Support for the Regional <i>Intelligentsia</i>	The preservation of the Cultural code	The Kazakh Culture (translated to the UN languages) must be delivered to the world. <i>Support of the cultural projects by the state</i> Support for the Regional <i>Intelligentsia</i> (100 of New Faces)

Source: www.akorda.kz, www.kremlin.ru

owned centers on education of patriotic youth like Molodezh'[Молодежь] (Nazarbayev 2013b) in Kazakhstan and RosMolodezh' [Росмолодежь] in Russia (in 2008) in analogy with the youth-oriented Soviet policy. The heritage of the Russian empire legacy - the Cadets – has also been imported into the Kazakhstani practice since 1996 in the form of the Cadet school named after Shokan Ualikhanov [Кадетский корпус им. Ш.Уалиханова]<sup>45</sup>. In 2015, another parallel with the Russian empire was invoked by the State secretary G.Abdikalikova, who re-articulated Russia's monarchical triune 'Autocracy-Orthodoxy-Nationality' [Самодержавие-Православие-Народность]<sup>46</sup> into the Nation's Father-People-Eternal Country' [Елбасы, Народ, Мәңгілік Ел]<sup>47</sup>. As it is rightly pointed, 'Mimicry, as an elite practice, is primarily accessible through the discourse at the postcolonial state level, evident in the rationale given for the development of laws, political institutions and foreign policy decisions' (Catherine Owen, John Heathershaw and Igor Savin 2017: 19). In 2015, following Russia's Law on the Foreign Agents and the Law on Gay Propaganda, Kazakhstan's political elites attempted to undertake the same legislative initiatives (Owen, Heathershaw and Savin 2017:16) which had not been approved as the country was planning to host Expo-2017 and anticipating foreign investors' capitals<sup>48</sup>. In some cases, the political rhetoric of both presidents went almost hand in hand. In 2012, both presidents announced that no way they would let the mono-ethnic state to appear (Putin 2012a, Nazarbayev 2012a). In 2013, N.Nazarbayev argued about the failure of the multicultural project in the European states (Nazarbayev 2011, 2013a), while Putin did it in 2012 (Putin 2012a). Yet there remain vague examples to mention here, N.Nazarbayev's grandson has lately announced his willingness to run the 'Snow Leopard Foundation'<sup>49</sup> almost like V.Putin, who has been supervising 'The Amur Tiger Program' since roughly 2013.

Coming back to Latinization, on the one hand, this reform could be taken as an attempt by the political elites to decolonize the nation's consciousness by cutting it off from Russia's cultural influence. On the other hand, the reform seems to be fragmental and ineffective, since there is no consent within the society on whether the Kazakh language should play a cohesive role or not. However, what devaluates any decolonization-like movements, in this case, is not the absence of the consent or solidarity, but the way how the Kazakhstan political elites run their policy - by mimicking the Russian discourse. While, in general, the state-led policy formally targets the Western and Asian models, in practice it is conducted in a similar way as in Russia. Despite the state-led attempts to free the country from the Russian cultural influence - the Latinization of the script or the translation of one hundred foreign textbooks to the Kazakh language - such policies will not yield many results because the political elites remain trapped in the colonial paradigm of thinking.

## **Conclusion**

The Chairman of the Senate Kassym-Jomart Tokayev in his interview to BBC, while commenting Putin's claim about Kazakhstan's belonging to the Russian world, said the following: 'Speaking about [Kazakhstan's belonging to] the Russian world, we don't

agree [on this], because here we have our world, which is Kazakh<sup>50</sup>. Being pushed by the provocative claims of President Putin, Kazakhstan's state authorities have forced the shift of the Kazakh alphabet from Cyrillic to Latin script in 2017. In the core, the Latinization reform is another facet of the nationalizing policy on the state-led identity of Kazakhstan, which, however, seems to have a limited effect on society. First, the state-led policy of Latinization is aimed at the Kazakh audience and mostly targets the young generation at schools and civil servants who need to learn the Latinized alphabet in a forced way. Second, the citizens do not fully recognize the Kazakh language's cohesive or bounding role taking into account the authoritative top-down way of its implementation and consequent lack of consent within the society. At the same time, the Latinization could be regarded as a state-driven attempt to decolonize the nation's consciousness through restriction of Russia's cultural influence. However, paying attention to how much the Kazakhstan political elites have borrowed from their Russian vis-à-vis, the state-led talks on decolonization remain vague and doubtful. By bringing numerous parallels between Kazakhstan's commitment to the Western and Asian approaches the political elites are aimed at further legitimization of their activities, while Russia's way is much more down to the reality and suitable for practical resemblance. Overall, by inserting the Western-like, Asian-like, Russian-like models of resemblance, the political elites have created a state-subaltern, the one who is not merely lacking representation by political means, but addicted to following any other path, except the own way. As long as the state authorities remain stigmatized by their inferior status and choose to stay dependent, they would not succeed in breaking out of the colonial way of thinking

## Notes

1. Translation of the author [Всвязислатиницеймывсеvступаемвобщий, развивающийсяинформационныймир, языкинтернета, языканаукиикультуры], 'Nazarbaev: v kirilitseneskol' kobukv, kotorievoobsche v kazakhskoileksike ne uchastvuyut', Zakon.kz, 1 December 2017, available at: <https://www.zakon.kz/4891855-nazarbaev-v-kirilitse-neskolko-bukv.html> Accessed 9 July 2018.
2. The Population Census of 2009, Kazakhstan's Agency of Statistics (2011).
3. For more information on the symbolic nation-building tools see Chris Isaacs (2016) "Cinema and Nation-Building in Kazakhstan".
4. Translation of the author [И сегодня главным фактором, цементирующим нацию, является казахский язык - языкгосударства].
5. Translation of the author [Сегодня в мире по разным оценкам ежегодно исчезает от 10 до 25 бесписьменных языков, уходят целые пласты этнических культур].
6. Rasporiazhenie Prezidenta Respubliki Kazakhstan 'Kontsepsia formirovaniagosudarstvennoy identichnosti Respubliki Kazakhstan' (23/05/1996), #2995; Nazarbayev (1996).
7. Nazarbayev (1997a, 1997b); the Strategy-2030 was incorporated into the Strategy-2050 (2012).
8. Nazarbayev (1999a, 1999b).
9. Nazarbayev (2000).
10. Nazarbayev (2001).
11. Nazarbayev (2003).
12. Nazarbayev (2005).
13. Nazarbayev (2006).
14. Nazarbayev (2007).

15. Translation of the author [АнатілімізМәңгілікЕлімізбенбіргеМәңгіліктілболды] or ‘Our mother language alongside with the Eternal motherland, has become an Eternal language’ (Nazarbayev 2014a).
16. Mangylik Elin Russanis translated as theNation of the Unified Future [НацияЕдиногоБудушего]. However, the Kazakh original term stipulates a more abstract understanding of it as the Eternal country/Eternal land/Eternal Nation. Nazarbayev’s understands it as the Eternal country [Вечнаястрана] (Nazarbayev 2016) or Eternal Motherland [ВечнаяРодина] (Nazarbayev 2015). Some researchers translate it as the Eternal nation (Kudaibergenova 2015: 453).
17. Translationoftheauthor [Вназваниинашейстраныестьокончание “стан”, какиудругихгосударствЦентральнойАзии. В то же время иностранцы проявляют интерес к Монголии, населениекоторой составляет всего два миллиона человек, при этом в ее названии отсутствует окончание “стан”. Возможно, надо рассмотреть со временем вопросперехода на название нашей страны Қазақелі, но прежде следует обязательно обсудить это с народом], Tengrinews.kz, 6 February 2014, availableat: [https://tengrinews.kz/kazakhstan\\_news/nazarbaev-vopros-pereimenovaniya-kazahstana-obsudit-narodom-250064/](https://tengrinews.kz/kazakhstan_news/nazarbaev-vopros-pereimenovaniya-kazahstana-obsudit-narodom-250064/) Accessed 9 July 2018.
18. Nazarbayev(2008).
19. Nazarbayev(2009).
20. Doktrinanatsional’ногоedinstvaKazakhstana(29/04/2010); Nazarbayev (2010).
21. Nazarbayev (2011).
22. Strategy ‘Kazakhstan-2050’ (Nazarbayev 2012a); Nazarbayev (2012b).
23. Nazarbayev (2013a).
24. PatrioticheskiiAkt‘Mangylik El’(15/12/2014); Nazarbayev (2014a, 2014b).
25. Kontsepsiiaukrepleniiairazvitiiakazakhstanskoiidentichnostiiedinstva(28/12/2015); Nazarbayev (2015).
26. Nazarbayev (2016).
27. Modernizatsiiaobshchestvennogosoznaniia‘RukhaniZhangiru’(Nazarbayev 2017a).
28. Mangylik Elbecomes a successor of the previous concept UlyDala Eli[ҰлыДалаЕлі].
29. Obrascheniedvizheniaslaviano-turkskogoedinstvaKazakhstana k presyenty N. Nazarbaevu po voprosammezhnatsional'ногоedinstva v strane', KassachiyKur’er, 03/11/2017, #10-11, pp.20-21.
30. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948), the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (1969), the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (1966), Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities (1992), as well as OSCE and OECD recommendations (Concept of 28/12/2015).
31. The commitment of the Kazakhstan state-led policy with the standards of OECD, OSCE, UN, UNICEF, UNFPA, and World Bank has been claimed by G.Abdikalikova (Abdikalikova 2015a, 2017b). In 2018, the state-owned Astana International Financial Center has been established, which follows the Anglo-Saxon Public Law in its activity. Nazarbayev University follows the internationalized Anglo-Saxon model (Laruelle 2015: 13).
32. According to N.Nazarbayev, Kazakhstan is going to get involved in the 4th industrial revolution (Nazarbayev 2018). Following the strategic plans, the state is aimed at entering into the Top-30 of the most developed states.
33. UnderRukhaniZhangiru, (1) the Kazakh literature has to be translated to UN languages and further presented to the world (the first presentation had been carried out in the headquarter of the UNESCO in Paris in October 2017); (2) the worldwide famous textbooks are going to be translated to the Kazakh language and conveyed to the schools and universities (the first translated textbooks are the works by the German, American, British theorists)(Abdikalikova 2018a).
34. Since 2010, Kazakhstan has internalized the norms of the Bologna declaration and European Higher Education Area.
35. From 2015 to 2017, G.Abdikalikova who is responsible for commenting presidential reforms and talking-to the people in the regions brought in her speeches numerous citations of the US and British political figures, while paying scarce attention to their Asian colleagues.

36. Translationoftheauthor [Совсем недавно Президент США Барак Обама в своем послании Конгрессу 21 января 2015 года также акцентировал внимание на экономике среднего класса. Это еще раз показывает выверенность, актуальность и современность Стратегического курса Елбасы] (Abdikalikova 2015b).
37. Translationoftheauthor [... Джордж Буш-старший...сказал когда-то о нашем Президенте просто и обезоруживающе: ‘Он способен предвидеть будущее’] (Abdikalikova 2015d).
38. The programs of Japan (Kokutai), Malaysia (Rukunegara), Indonesia (Panch-Sila), China (the Harmonic Development)lied into the basis of Kazakhstan’s modernization (Abdikalikova 2017b).
39. According to N.Nazarbayev, the successful experience in state-owned property management and institutional transformations have been demonstrated by the Singaporean ‘Temasek Holdings’, the Malaysian ‘Khazanah Nasional’ and the UAE ‘Mubadala’ (Nazarbayev 2014c).
40. The Agency for Civil Service Affairs and Anticorruption: <http://kyzmet.gov.kz/ru/pages/sbornik-materialov-po-issledovaniyu-zarubezhnogo-opyta-protivodeystviya-korruptsii>.
41. Translationoftheauthor [Некоторые государственные и политические лидеры мира в разных форматах пытались привлечь нас к своим, с одной стороны, идеями панисламизма, с другой – пантюркизма, а с третьей – “ценностями и преимуществами” западной цивилизации, свободы и демократии... Судьбу республики мы, казахстанцы, взяли в свои руки!].
42. TheKazakh-DhungarwarunderAnrakay (1729-1730).
43. The Seliger meeting, August 2014, available at: <http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/46507> Accessed 9 July 2018.
44. More on Soviet patriotism, see Oleg Naida (2012). Rossiiskiy patriotism. Proshloeinastoyashee.
45. The Ministry of Defense: [https://www.mod.gov.kz/rus/obrazovanie/pravila\\_i\\_instrukcii/?cid=0&rid=3713](https://www.mod.gov.kz/rus/obrazovanie/pravila_i_instrukcii/?cid=0&rid=3713).
46. For more information see Alexander Etkind (2013). Internal Colonization: Russia’s Imperial Experience.
47. Abdikalikova (2015c).
48. Russia remains the strong model for mimicking for in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, while ‘the Western influence has been receding’(Owen, Heathershaw and Savin 2017: 16).
- ‘49. VnukPrezidentaNazarbaevazapustilproekt to spaseniusnezhnikhbarsov v Kazakhstane’, News.21.by, 28 June 2018, available at: <http://news.21.by/other-news/2018/06/28/1534437.html> Accessed 9 July 2018.
- 50 ‘Hard Talk with Kassym-JomartTokayev, the Chairman of the Senate of Kazakhstan’ on BBC, 20 June 2018, available at: <https://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/n3ct4f61> Accessed 9 July 2018.

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