

# AGRARIAN QUESTION IN THE 18<sup>TH</sup> CENTURY CENTRAL ASIAN PEASANT REVOLTS

*Imtiyaz Shah*

## **Abstract**

*The peasant revolts, described as “the weapons of the weak,” were multi-causal phenomenon. Some factors sowed their seeds, some nurtured them while some helped in their outburst. The paper is an endeavour to analyze the agrarian factors behind the peasant revolts. Retrieving the data from the historical and revenue records, the paper reveals that the major factor that triggered the revolts, was the exploitative character of the agrarian system. The peasants, as the main source of the income for the state, were subjected to number of unethical and illegal exactions which ultimately brought about economic insecurity to them and, consequently, triggered the revolts. Since the revolts led to loss of income to the state and landlords which forced the rulers to initiate several relief measures. This later proved rhetoric and sounded more to the benefit of state and landlords than the peasants who continued to suffer.*

## **Keywords**

Feudal Gifts, Defensive Reactions, Weapon of Weak, Central Asian Khanates, Peasants, Tax, Levy, Production, Landlords, Agrarian, Peasant Revolts, Khans and Amirs, Exactions.

## **Introduction**

This is one of the relatively least studied aspect of the agrarian history of Central Asian Khanates.<sup>1</sup> Peasant revolt may simply be described as a civil defiance by the peasants. These revolts usually occur on account of the threats to peasants' access to an economic subsistence. In medieval Central Asia as elsewhere in the period, these revolts for want of political insight and leadership were usually expressed through predatory and protective strategies including acts of exodus, protest, denial of tax and rent, concealment of produce, carelessness, wreckage of agricultural implements.<sup>2</sup> However, the classic act of the defiance was refusal to pay land revenue<sup>3</sup> that, in fact, constitutes the common trait in the peasant revolts of Central Asians during the period under study. In the 20<sup>th</sup> century a discourse started among the social scientists regarding the nature, wider socio-economic and political implications of the peasant revolts. Consequently, diverse theories were advocated. James C. Scott described them as “weapons of the weak,”<sup>4</sup> while Eric Wolf termed them as “parochial reactions” by politically unaware class (peasants). Some understand them as “defensive reactions”<sup>5</sup> of the economically marginalized class of society. Whatever the descriptions, the fact of the matter remains that these revolts proved a dynamic force against

the injustice inflicted on the peasants and, thus, a catalyst for anti-systemic change.<sup>6</sup>

### **Inequitable Economic Resources and Peasant Exploitation**

In the 18<sup>th</sup> century discourse on Central Asia, there is a consensus among the debaters that the century was a period of political crises and economic stagnation. Under the scenario, in order to relieve the state from paying the civil and military officials in deficient cash and ensure the state control over the remote areas, the Khans and Amirs distributed some portions of land as grants among heirs, civil and military officials called (*tankhoh/chek*).<sup>7</sup> The mechanism instead of solving the problem for smooth administration gave rise to the growth of large estates of the feudal type with a varying share in the overall land composition. For example, as per the land records in Bukhara 12.2 percent land was personal property of the Amir (*khasa*); 55.8 percent *amlok* (state land); and 24.2 percent *waqf*.<sup>8</sup> While in Khiva, 2/3<sup>rd</sup> of the land belonged to the Khan and other landlords, 1/7<sup>th</sup> was *waqf* and *amlok*. As regards the land with peasant ownership, called *milki*, it was only 7.8 percent in Bukhara and 1/10<sup>th</sup> in Khokand.<sup>9</sup> The peasants working on these estates were the mere tenants, held non-proprietary land rights, and paid a certain quantum, usually substantial, of their produce as rent, tax and interest.<sup>10</sup>

Since peasants were the basic source of income for the state and landlords, therefore, were forced to pay maximum through taxes and levies. The major land tax (*kharaj*) was realized at 2/3<sup>rd</sup> of the produce as against ½ or 1/4<sup>th</sup> prescribed by the state.<sup>11</sup> *Mirobana* (water duty) was charged at the rate of 10 percent of the annual produce and so were four cattle required to be annually delivered by each tribal family in the name of *kibitka* (house tax).<sup>12</sup> The additional levies (*wajuhat*) included *kish puli* (levy on a pair of draught animal in relation to land holding), *yak shira* (head-wise levy on draught animals), *qafshan* (levy paid towards revenue functionaries like *amlokdar*), *tanaf puli* and *alaf puli* (levy on orchards and vegetable gardens), *kuprul puli* (toll on bridges), *baj* (custom duty paid towards the lord), *nikhana* (duty on marriage contracts), *tarikana/tarakana* (duty on legal documents of inheritance),<sup>13</sup> various gifts presented to landlords on the eve of community feasts (*toi*) apart,<sup>14</sup> in all fifty five in Bukhara and twenty five in Khiva.<sup>15</sup> Further, the peasants were required to perform several unpaid services (*hasher*) to their landlords, to maintain their orchards, canals, houses and roads.<sup>16</sup> The extracts from a letter written in 1874 by a native complaining against the exactions of the Khan of Khokand is quoted here in this regard:

“... were [peasants] to keep the roads in repair, to build houses for the Khan, to cultivate his gardens and to clean out the canals, men are seized in all parts of the country and forced to work. These get no pay, not even their food, and besides this, when half a village is forced to work, the other half is compelled to pay a tax of two tenga a day for each man during his work. Anyone who runs away or who refuses to pay is whipped. Sometimes people have been whipped to death, and others have been buried alive in the place of work ...”<sup>17</sup>

The artisan and merchant communities were subjected to *aminana* (tax

paid by whole-sales in Bukhara Khanate)<sup>18</sup> and *dallyali* (tax paid by the retailers towards the lords),<sup>19</sup> besides the payment of *zakat* at the rate of 2½ percent of their annual earnings aside.<sup>20</sup> On account of the multiplicity of exactions on the peasants and traders, Sudr-ud-Din Ayni, a native of Emirate of Bukhara sarcastically maintains that only air was exempted in Bukhara.<sup>21</sup> The exactions were so high that the concept of saving did not exist and purchasing over land (*milki*) was too distant for fear of high exactions.<sup>22</sup> Paradoxically, rent was collected in advance for several years together and arbitrarily increased as high as seven fold.<sup>23</sup> On top of it, they had to buy the commodities at the exorbitant prices fixed by the landlords themselves which was embarrassing to all lower strata of the Khanates.<sup>24</sup> Compared to the high prices, wages were substantially low. A cobbler in Bukhara usually earns only 45 *puls* daily,<sup>25</sup> whereas bread alone cost half the amount of his daily earnings. Similarly, a room in the *caravanserai* could be held at 2-4 *tangas* a month.<sup>26</sup> The prices of the dress material being unaffordable,<sup>27</sup> people wore ragged clothes.<sup>28</sup> There was, therefore, a marked difference between the peasant earnings and the market prices of their daily consumer goods.

### **Peasant Revolts**

Under the circumstances of high and large number of exactions, the peasants had just not a little earnings for the whole year.<sup>29</sup> Consequently, they were forced to look around for food and borrow loans or else resort to theft and brigandage.<sup>30</sup> The loans (*bunak*) were provided by the landlords at quite high interest rates ranging between 40 and 60 percent when these were obtained by the landlords at low interest rates of 8-9 percent.<sup>31</sup> The debts so accumulated would force the peasant to sell whatever and if ever they had any material possession with them.<sup>32</sup> The gap could have been easily plugged by them with surplus produce, which they did not have due to high exactions, traditional agricultural tools and lack of requisite manures.<sup>33</sup> Most of the land situated between Panjdeh to Yalatum of the Murgab valley of Samarkand<sup>34</sup> was deserted.<sup>35</sup> This brought them face to face with their tax collectors and landlords with exodus as a viable alternative to escape their highhandedness.<sup>36</sup>

Though references to various revolts are ample but lack several details about their real nature and character.<sup>37</sup> Out of the scanty details, 1784 uprising in Bukhara erupted swallowed over 1,000 people.<sup>38</sup> In 1800 the Turkmen peasants and artisans of Merv reacted to the excesses of the Bukharan *zakatchis*<sup>39</sup> and in 1801, the revolt spread to Kerki.<sup>40</sup> The similar demonstration was recorded against the ill treatment of Mirza Razi of Mazandaran in 1813. The Yamuts and Goklan tribes stirred up and resisted the rule of Astrakhan in 1826-27 and 1841.<sup>41</sup> The biggest uprising was that of the Kitay Qipchaq of Miyan Qala situated between Bukhara and Samarkand against the reign of Sultan Haider (1800-25 AD).<sup>42</sup> Khokand experienced several disturbances during the reign of Sher Ali Khan (1842-45 AD).<sup>43</sup> In 1855, Abdul Vasi organized the revolt of the peasants of Baljuan against the exorbitant rent/tax structure of Amir Muzaffar (1860-1885) of Bukhara.<sup>44</sup> Hard pressed by the excesses of the state and landlords/feudatories in Tashkent, the masses at large welcomed the anti-feudal response of General Chernief in 1865, notwithstanding his representing the imperial

Russia, stating ... let every man carry on his work – houses, gardens, fields, lands, and water mills, of which you have possession, will remain your property. The soldiers will take nothing from you ...<sup>45</sup> It was perhaps for this reason that the masses of the Emirate appreciated the upcoming Russian rule.<sup>46</sup> In 1858 AD, in Tashkent and Dast-i-Qipchaq, the peasants of Kyrgyz and Kazak ethnic background sharply reacted to the additional taxes and levies levied by Mirza Ahmad Qushbegi.<sup>47</sup> The tax collectors who had been sent there were robbed, stripped almost naked, and beaten back leading to killing of one functionary.<sup>48</sup> The uprisings gained momentum under the Tsarists (1860-1917 AD). Shahr-i-Sabz region of Samarkand registered a strong uprising in 1868 AD.<sup>49</sup> Similarly, three oblasts of Samarkand, Farghana and Syr Darya experienced 668 uprisings from 1887-1898: 429 in Farghana, 182 in Samarkand, 57 in Syr Darya. The 16 bandit attacks in Farghana and 9 in Samarkand in 1899 enhanced to 324 in Farghana by 1917 and 166 in Samarkand by 1915.<sup>50</sup>

### **Relief and Responsive Measures**

Since the state and landlords thrived on the rent and labour of the peasants, the major source of their income they, as such, strived to keep the tenants in good humour for they laid golden egg for them. Nonetheless, as a pressure tactics, they used force to reckon with the restive peasants. The response of the Amir Subhan Kuli Khan (1681-1702 AD) and Baqi Mohammad of Bukhara offer the typical example in this behalf. Being the lord and overlord, the former enhanced the rent of the peasants by seven times,<sup>51</sup> and the latter stopped the water supply of Nasaf Canal for irrigation of the arable land of the restive peasants.<sup>52</sup> Simultaneously, for strategic reasons, they combined force with aid and assistance of the tenants, and provided them relief in terms of food, clothing and agricultural implements like metal plough driven by horses, yoke and assess: the latter were also used to drive mills (*Chahar Kharas* - Four Ass Mills).<sup>53</sup> True the peasants were bound to render extra service to the landlords for the maintenance of their fields and houses.<sup>54</sup> At the same time, the landlords facilitated them drawing water from the canals for irrigation of their agricultural fields.<sup>55</sup> Credit loans (*bunak*) and other agricultural implements were advanced to them and, at times, levies and taxes were remitted.<sup>56</sup> The provision of providing food, clothes etc. were the other sources of support to the tenants.<sup>57</sup>

No doubt, at times, such a relief caused financial loss to the state and landlords, but they made up the same by enforcing their own choice of production on the peasants. While Mohammad Rahim, Khan of Khiva, exempted cattle and other taxes of the tenants, he juxtapose forced them to grow wheat, rice, sesame and jagan to meet their export demand, which automatically restricted the scope of free peasant production. Further, the tenants were barred to sell whatever little surplus they had until the feudatories had disposed of whole lot of produce and that too at the arbitrarily fixed prices.<sup>58</sup> Similarly, the credit loans were advanced to the tenants at the high interest rate of 40-60 percent.<sup>59</sup> Slaves too were subjected to a certain share of their produce to the lords. For instance, a Russian slave, Gregory Pulakoff, paid seven *tillas*<sup>60</sup> to his master out of the income.<sup>61</sup> Thus, state/landlord support to

the tenants was virtually rhetoric, and sounded more to the benefit of lords than the peasants. Peasants' recalcitrance was but natural to follow the above phenomenon.

### **Role of the States vis-à-vis Landlords and the Peasants**

The privileges granted to landlords by the Amirs and Khans had some adverse implications. Not only the peasants were exposed to increasing complications but state lost the revenue in the regions assigned to the assignees.<sup>62</sup> Since it was a complicated problem so the state thought in terms of bringing the state-landlord-peasant relationship within the legal framework. With this intention, Amir Nasrullah (1826-1860) in Bukhara, introduced several politico-administrative reforms,<sup>63</sup> to re-establish the state sovereignty and subject everything including the *begs* to it. Accordingly, he confiscated all *tankhoh* grants and brought them under *amluk* (state land) suggesting, thereby, that the rights of the landlords on land were of non-usufruct nature. Subsequently, *tankhoh* grants were re-allotted to the able and loyal men who acknowledged the king as their sovereign. Similarly, *waqf* grants were rationalized on paternal rather than the hierarchical lines.<sup>64</sup> The *begs* were also directed to share a certain part of their revenue with the state (the king).<sup>65</sup> Slavery was abolished by Abdul Ahad (Amir of Bukhara 1885-1910) though its reminiscence continued.<sup>66</sup> The Khan of Khokand, Alim Khan (1799-1811), worked out a four-pronged plan to strengthen the state against the feudal system: forbade feudal gifts and the taxes/levies except those prescribed by the state. He also de-recognized the prices of legal deeds at will and instead of land grants paid his officials in terms of regular salary.<sup>67</sup> Similarly, in Khiva, Illtuzar or Ilt Nazar (1804-1806) marginalized the power of the landlords/feudatories by including Sarts in administration.<sup>68</sup>

The facts and figures analyzed above, lead to believe that notwithstanding these measures, the excesses on the peasants perpetuated as before. The landlords, sufficiently powerful, hindered the reforms to retain their privileges. Under the situation, the state found it imperative to increase its exactions from the peasantry as was the case under various Khans and Amirs. Even the early Tsars (1860-1917) proved of no respite to the peasants.<sup>69</sup> The regime change proved just putting old wine in new bottles for the peasants of the Khanates.

### **References & Notes**

- 1 The contemporary authorities who have worked on some aspects of the problem include Paolo Sartori, Beatrice Forbes Manz, E. A. Allworth, Scott C. Levi, Ron Sela, Mansura Haidar, Lawrence Krader, D. S. M. Williams and Mushtaq A. Kaw.
- 2 Elizabeth J. Perry, *Rebels and Revolutionaries in North China 1845-1945*, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1980, pp. 58, 95.
- 3 Irfan Habib, *The Agrarian System of Mughal India 1556-1707*, New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1999, p. 378.
- 4 James C. Scott, *Weapons of the Weak: Everyday Forms of Peasant Resistance*, New Heaven: Yale University Press, 1885: Cf. Mark B. Tauger, "Soviet Peasants and Collectivization, 1930-39: Resistance and Adaptation," *The Journal of Peasant Studies*, Vol. 31, Nos. 3&4, London: Taylor and Francis Ltd., April/July, 2004, p. 438.

- 5 L.Vergara-Camus, "The MST and the EZLN Struggle for Land: New Forms of Peasant Rebellions," *Journal of Agrarian Change*, 9(3), 2009, p. 374.
- 6 Eric Wolf, *Peasant Wars of the Twentieth Century*, Oklahoma: University of Oklahoma Press, 1969, p. 295; Petras, J. and H. Veltmeyer, "Are Latin American Peasant Movements Still a Force for Change? Some New Paradigms Revisited," *The Journal of Peasant Studies*, 28/2, 2001, p. 92.
- 7 *Dar masala ki bar taqdir-ian-ki Khushak Bik*, Central State Archive of Uzbekistan, f. I-164, op. 1, d. 13, l: Cf. Paolo Sartori, "Colonial Legislation meets Sharia: Muslims' Land Rights in Russian Turkestan," *Central Asian Survey*, Vol. 29, No. 1, Routledge, March 2010, p. 46; Ira Marvin Lapidus, *A History of Islamic Societies*, London: Cambridge University Press, Second Edition, 2002, p. 345.
- 8 Helene Carrere D' Ecausse, *Islam and Russian Empire: Reform and Revolution in Central Asia*, tr. by Quintin Hoare, London: I. B. Tauris and Co. Ltd., 1966, reprint 2009, p. 9; D. S. M. Williams, "Fiscal Reform in Turkestan," *The Slavonic and East European Review*, Vol. 52, No. 128, Modern Humanities Research Association and University College Maney Publishing, July, 1974, pp. 428-429.
- 9 In Khiva proper, Naqsbandi Sheikhs (Khojas) of the village of Cadak controlled 45% irrigated land as *waqf*: *Central Asia in Modern Times*, p. 67; Yuri Bregel, "Central Asia-VII: In the 18<sup>th</sup>-19<sup>th</sup> Centuries," <http://www.iranica.com/articles/central-asia-vii> (accessed: 10/08/2010); Geoffrey Wheeler, *Modern History of Soviet Central Asia*, London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1964, p. 46; W. P. and Zeldia K. Coates, *Soviets in Central Asia*, Bombay: People's Publishing House, reprint 1952, p. 38.
- 10 Nikolai Kharin, *Vegetation Degradation in Central Asia under the Impact of Human Activities*, Netherlands: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2002, p. 43.
- 11 Mansura Haidar, *Medieval Central Asia: Polity, Economy and Military Organization (Fourteenth to Sixteenth Centuries)*, New Delhi: Manohar Publishers and Distributors, 2004, p. 437.
- 12 It was a household tax covering the nomadic population. Each household was to pay annually four cattle to the authority.
- 13 Mulla Mohammad Yunis Djan, *The Life of Alimqul: A Native Chronicle of the 19<sup>th</sup> century Central Asia*, tr. Timur K. Beisembiev, New York/London: Routledge Curzon, 2003, fns. 77, 206, 207, 208, pp. 16, 60; *Islam and Russian Empire: Reform and Revolution in Central Asia*, pp. 30-31.
- 14 Paul George Geiss, *Pre-Tsarist and Tsarist Central Asia: Communal Commitment and Political Order in Change*, London/ New York: Tylor and Francis Group, 2003, p. 91; Alfred J. Rieber, "Landed Property, State Authority, and Civil War," *Slavic Review*, Vol. 47, No. 1, New York: The American Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies, Spring, 1988, p.37.
- 15 *Central Asia in Modern Times: A History from early 19<sup>th</sup> Century*, p. 67.
- 16 Ella R. Christie, *Through Khiva to Golden Samarkand*, London: Seeley, Service and Co. Limited, 1925, p. 204; *Central Asia: A Century of Russian Rule*, p. 273.
- 17 Eugene Schuyler, *Turkistan: Notes of a Journey in Russian Turkistan, Khokand, Bukhara and Kuldja*, New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, Vol. II, 1885, pp. 57-60.
- 18 *Islam and Russian Empire: Reform and Revolution in Central Asia*, p. 30; Seymour Becker, *Russian Protectorates in Central Asia: Bukhara and Khiva (1865-1924)*, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1968, p. 173.
- 19 *Russia's Protectorates in Central Asia: Bukhara and Khiva (1865-1924)*, p. 319.

- 20 *Through Khiva to Golden Samarkand*, p. 92.
- 21 Devendra Kaushak, *Central Asia in Modern Times: A History from early 19<sup>th</sup> Century*, Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1970, p. 67.
- 22 B. G. Gufurov, *Central Asia: Pre-Historic to Pre-Modern Times*, Vol. 2, Kolkata: Maulana Abul Kalam Azad Institute of Asian Studies, 2005, p. 391.
- 23 Subhan Kuli Khan (1681-1702 AD), an Astarkhanid ruler increased the tax and levies seven fold. Similarly, Khudyar Khan (1845-1858) of Khokand imposed levies even on wild fruit trees in mountain areas of Osh: B. G. Gufurov, *Central Asia: Pre-Historic to Pre-Modern Times*, Vol. 2, Kolkata: Maulana Abul Kalam Azad Institute of Asian Studies, 2005, p. 391; S. Frederick Starr (ed.), *Ferghana Valley: The Heart of Central Asia*, Caucasus Institute and Silk Route Studies Program: Sharpe Publishers, 1886, p. 39.
- 24 Alexander Burns, *Travels into Bukhara together with a Narrative of a Voyage on the Indus*, Lahore: Sang-e-Meel Publications, reprint 2003, p. 248; Chahryar Adle and Irfan Habib, *History of Civilizations of Central Asia* (ed.), Part V, Paris: UNESCO Publishing, 2003, p. 378.
- 25 *Pul* or *Ful* was a copper coin and fifty *puls* were equal to one *tenghe*.
- 26 E. V. Rtveladze, "Eastern and Northern Central Asia (c. 1750 to c. 1850)," *History of Civilizations of Central Asia*, Part V, p. 449.
- 27 A. Vambery, *Travels in Central Asia being the Account of a Journey from Teheran across the Turkoman Desert on the Eastern Shore of the Caspian to Khiva, Bokhara, and Samarcand*, [hereafter, *Travels in Central Asia*], New Delhi: Bhavana Books and Prints, reprint 1996, p. 423.
- 28 James Hutton, *Central Asia from the Aryan to the Cossacks*, New Delhi: Manas Publications, 1875, reproduced 2005, p. 237.
- 29 Olaf Caroe, *Soviet Empire: The Turks of Central Asia and Stalinism*, New York: St. Martin's Press, 1967, p. 167.
- 30 Francis Henry Skrine and Edward Denison Ross, *The Heart of Asia: A History of Russian Turkistan and the Central Asian Khanates from the Earliest Times*, London: Methuen and Co., 1899, p. 243.
- 31 *Central Asia in Modern Times: A History from Early Times*, p. 69.
- 32 *Through Khiva to Golden Samarkand*, p. 235; *Central Asia: Pre-Historic to Pre-Modern Times*, Vol. 2, p. 391.
- 33 The droppings of the cattle were mostly used as coal. The only manure was the silt from rivers and canals and pigeon droppings: E. A. Allworth (ed.), *Central Asia: A Century of Russian Rule*, New York/London: Columbia University Press, 1967, p. 277.
- 34 About Samarkand, Mir Izzatullah observed, "It (Samarkand) had fallen into such utter ruin and decay, that tigers and wolves had actually taken adobe in the colleges ... which was situated in the centre of the city": Mir Izzatullah, *Travels in Central Asia in the Year 1812-13*, tr. P. D. Henderson, Calcutta: Foreign Department, 1882, p. 56.
- 35 Frederic John Goldsmid, "On Journeys between Herat and Khiva: Lecture," Friday, January 31, 1875, Foreign and Commonwealth Office Collection, pp. 11, 12.
- 36 Following the series of Qipchaq invasions into Samarkand in 1735 about 12,000 residents fled to India: T. K. Beisembiev, "Farghana's Contacts with India in the

*Agrarian Question in the 18<sup>th</sup> Century Central Asian Peasant Revolts*

- 18<sup>th</sup> and 19<sup>th</sup> Centuries,” *Journal of Asian Studies*, Vol. 28, No. 2, pp. 124-35: Cf. Scott. C. Levi (ed.), *India and Central Asia: Commerce and Culture (1500-1800)*, New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2007, fn. 84, p. 120.
- 37 The 18<sup>th</sup>-19<sup>th</sup> century peasant revolts though widely discussed, demand real and scientific interpretation.
- 38 We do not have the details about the number of the peasants, artisans and government functionaries killed in the revolt.
- 39 *Zakatchis* were entrusted with the work of collecting *zakat*.
- 40 *Islam and Russian Empire: Reform and Revolution in Central Asian*, p. 35.
- 41 M. Annanepesov, “The Turkmens,” *History of Civilizations of Central Asia*, Part V, p. 136.
- 42 “The Manghits,” *History of Civilizations of Central Asia*, Part V, p. 57
- 43 To stabilize the situation Musalman Qul, the *Mongbashi* (commander of 1,000 troops) was sent to quell the revolt: *History of Civilizations of Central Asia*, Part V, p. 75.
- 44 The poor peasant leader was defeated and executed at Shahrissabz, nonetheless he remained a legend: *Islam and Russian Empire: Reform and Revolution in Central Asian*, p. 35.
- 45 Cf. *Through Khiva to Golden Samarkand*, p. 245.
- 46 David MacKenzie, “Kaufman of Turkestan: An Assessment of his Administration, 1867-1881,” *Slavic Review*, Vol. 26, No. 2, The Editors and Board of Trustees of the Russian Review, 1967, pp. 274, 280-81; Beatrice Forbes Manz, “Central Asian Uprisings in the Nineteenth Century: Ferghana under the Russians,” *Russian Review*, Vol. 46, No. 3, Blackwell Publishing on behalf of The Editors and Board of Trustees of the Russian Review, Jul., 1987, p. 276.
- 47 *The Life of Alimqul: A Native Chronicle of the 19<sup>th</sup> century Central Asia*, pp. 20-21.
- 48 *Turkistan: Notes of a Journey in Russian Turkistan, Khokand, Bukhara and Kuldja*, Vol. II, p. 46.
- 49 *Central Asia in Modern Times: A History from Early Times*, p. 82.
- 50 G. P. Galuzo, *Turkistan Koloniya (Turkestan a Colony)*, Tashkent, 1935, p. 93: Cf. *Islam and Russian Empire: Reform and Revolution in Central Asia*, p. 74; P. G. Galuzo, *Turkistan Kaloniya*, Tashkent, 1935, p. 90: Cf. *Central Asia in Modern Times: A History from Early Times*, p. 85.
- 51 *Central Asia: Pre-Historic to Pre-Modern Times* Vol. 2, p. 391.
- 52 V. V. Barthold, *Sochinenija*, Vol. III, Moscow: 1969, p. 161, Cf: Mansura Hiader, *Medieval Central Asia: Polity, Economy and Military Organization (Fourteenth to Sixteenth Centuries)*, New Delhi: Manohar Publishers and Distributors, 2004, p. 426.
- 53 N. Masanov, K. M. Baipakov, S. Moosvi and A. Buron, “The Economy: Production and Trade,” *History of Civilizations of Central Asia*, p. 392.
- 54 N. Masanov, K. M. Baipakov, S. Moosvi and A. Buron, “The Economy: Production and Trade,” *History of Civilizations of Central Asia*, p. 392.
- 55 Mirza Hayder Doughlat, *Tarikh-i-Rashidi*, Eng. tr. N. Elias and E. Denison Ross, *History of Mongols of Central Asia*, 2<sup>nd</sup> ed., London, 1898, p. 67; *History of Civilizations of Central Asia*, p. 377.
- 56 Nikolay Murav'yov, *Journey to Khiva Through the Turkmon Country*, London:

- Oguz Press, 1977, pp. 139-140.
- 57 K. K. Pahlen, *Mission to Turkestan*, trans. N. J. Couriss (London, 1964), pp. 100-101; R. Pierce, *Russian Central Asia*, pp. 168-71; *Istoriia UzSSR*, pp. 70-71: Cf. "Central Asian Uprisings in the Nineteenth Century: Ferghana under the Russians," *Russian Review*, pp. 274-275.
- 58 *Journey to Khiva Through the Turkmon Country*, pp. 139-140.
- 59 *Central Asia in Modern Times: A History from the Early 19th Century*, p. 69.
- 60 *Travels into Bukhara together with a Narrative of a Voyage on the Indus*, p. 119.
- 61 *Travels into Bukhara together with a Narrative of a Voyage on the Indus*, p. 136.
- 62 The weak landlords/feudallords sub-infeudated their estates for reasons: to escape the obligations of payment of tribute to the overlord, and protection to the subjects in the event of external invasions.
- 63 *Islam and Russian Empire: Reform and Revolution in Central Asian*, pp. 25-26, 28-29.
- 64 *Islam and Russian Empire: Reform and Revolution in Central Asian*, p. 10; Suchandana Chatteejee, "The Emirate of Bukhara in the 19<sup>th</sup> and 20<sup>th</sup> centuries: Reflections on Transition," Gabriele Rasuly-Paleczek, Julia Katschnig (eds.), *Central Asia on Display*, Proceedings of VII Conference of the European Society for Central Asian Studies, Vienna Central Asian Studies, 2004, p. 33.
- 65 *Islam and Russian Empire: Reform and Revolution in Central Asian*, pp. 25, 26, 27, 29.
- 66 Rustam Khan-Urfi, *Diary of a Slave*, London, 1936, p. 69: Cf. B. D. Hopkins, "Race, Sex and Slavery: 'Forced Labour' in Central Asia and Afghanistan in the Early 19th Century," *Modern Asian Studies*, Vol. 42, No. 4, London: Cambridge University Press, 2008, p. 669; *Russian Protectorates in Central Asia: Bukhara and Khiva (1865-1924)*, p. 200.
- 67 I. Umnyakov, "Kistorii novometodnoi shkoly v Bukhare," (Contribution to the History of the Reformed Schools in Bukhara), *Byulleten SAGU*, No. 16, 1927, p. 89: Cf. *Islam and Russian Empire: Reform and Revolution in Central Asian*, p. 90; *Russian Protectorates in Central Asia: Bukhara and Khiva (1865-1924)*, p. 207.
- 68 Svat Succek, *History of Inner Asia*, London: Cambridge University Press, 2002, p. 187.
- 69 Vladimir Shlapentokh, "Early Feudalism - The Best Parallel for Contemporary Russia," *Europe-Asia Studies*, Vol. 48, No. 3, London: Tylor and Francis Ltd., May, 1996, pp. 393-400.

